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Summary	
 
The regime of centralised authorisation 
of production and trade of genetically 
modified organisms (GMO) in the EU 
is a shambles but recent amendment 
proposals do not even begin to address 
the problem.  
 
Although in its own review the 
European Commission recognises that 
the regulation now in force does not 
work, it insists on keeping it intact, and 
is prepared only to allow recalcitrant 
states to opt out of it by banning GMO 
varieties which are already authorised 
by the EU. 
 
The main problem with the EU 
approach to GMOs is in its narrow 
understanding of risk and safety. To 
overcome the persistent political 
controversy on the issue, member 
states have adopted a system where 
final decisions are heavily dependent 
on expert assessment of the safety of 
each individual variety. Thus ‘science’ 
is supposed to carry the day, and who 
can be ‘against science’?  
 
However, what counts as science is 
itself a contentious issue. The view that 
is enshrined in law confines science 
above all to laboratory experiments, 
e.g. whether rats fed on the GMOs 
develop abnormally. The effect of 
GMOs on the environment into which 
they are released is also taken into 
account, but such data is less readily 
available, especially data on longer 
term and larger scale effects. On the 
other hand, studies of, for example, the 
effect of GMO on existing farming 
practices and consumption patterns, or 
the costs imposed on farmers who wish 
to remain GM-free, are excluded 
completely. On this view they would 
be considered a matter of politics, and 
non-science — even if social studies 
can provide plenty of data for various 
adverse effects.  
 
Further to this major design flaw, the 
present report identifies a number of 
other problems in the existing 
legislation: 
 
 —  the expert assessment effectively 
preempts the judgement of the political 
institutions, such as the Commission 
and the Council. Such delegation is 
impermissible under the Treaty of 
Rome. 
 
 —   in this way the precautionary 
principle is rendered inoperative. 
 
To remedy the situation the regime 
must be amended. This report offers a 
number of specific amendments to the 
text of the relevant secondary 
legislation which boil down to the 
following: 
 
 
- the responsibility of the 
Commission and the margin of 
discretion in any decision need 
to be recognised and made 
explicit. 
- uncertainty of any assessment 
and provisionality of any 
judgement must be 
acknowledged; lack of 
evidence should not be equated 
with lack of effect. 
- risk managers should be put 
back in charge of risk analysis 
by allowing them to feed back 
into the risk assessment 
requests for consideration of 
the anticipated effect of their 
final decision; in turn, risk 
assessors should consider 
various scenarios. 
- procedural details and voting 
rules should be revised, to 
restore the functionality of the 
committees of national experts 
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(‘comitology’) in order to 
restore the political control 
which has been blocked for a 
dozen years now. 
- The independence of the risk 
assessor (the European Food 
Safety Authority, EFSA) 
should be restored by 
diversifying the expertise of its 
members and employees. 
- Opportunity for public 
participation should be 
enhanced by requiring 
consideration of all factors 
which are relevant for the 
stakeholders rather than 
discarding most of their 
concerns as non-scientific.
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Introduction	
 
On 22 April 2015 the European 
Commission published a review of the 
current legislation regulating the 
authorisation, import, cultivation and 
marketing of genetically modified 
organisms (GMO) in the Union (the 
GM Review)1 and tabled a proposal for 
its amendment (the GM Proposal).2 
The GM Proposal aims to allow 
Member States to ban the use on their 
territory of genetically modified 
organisms already authorised under the 
EU legislation. The proposal is 
analogous to the facility to opt out 
from the cultivation of authorised 
GMOs that was finally adopted earlier 
this year.3 While the adoption of the 
latter amendment was difficult and 
took a full five years, the new proposal 
has managed to unite both 
environmentalists and the biotech 
industry in opposing it4 and, after the 
European Parliament voted 577 to 75 
against it, is as good as dead.5 Yet its 
introduction, together with the 
Commission’s official assessment of 
the GMO regime, has prompted the 
alternative evaluation of the existing 
legislation and practice offered by the 
present report. This report identifies 
several major problems of the 
regulation in force, criticises the 
Commission’s failure to make any 
attempt to address them and makes a 
number of specific suggestions as to 
how the legislation should be 
amended.  
 
By now, there is a wide recognition 
that the current regime for 
authorisation of marketing and 
cultivation of GMOs is inoperative. 
Indeed, a dozen years after the relevant 
legislation was established, only one 
decision for authorisation of a new GM 
crop has been adopted – the Amflora 
potato6 – and that was annulled by the 
General Court.7 Decisions for 
marketing have fared slightly better – 
there are a few dozen authorised 
GMOs – but still the decisions take 
many years, raise persistent 
controversies and are adopted without 
the support of the relevant committee 
of national experts. In the view of the 
present author, an adequate GMO 
regime should result in negative 
decisions because of the persistent 
scientific uncertainty.8 Naturally, in the 
view of the biotech industry the 
opposite is true and the regime should 
smoothly yield positive decisions but  
everyone agrees that functioning 
governance should yield, above all, 
decisions one way or the other. It is 
remarkable that while the Commission 
has been persistently favourable to the 
authorisation of new GMO varieties, 
the assessments it relies on fail to 
convince the Member States, so the 
expert committees (and the Council) 
have never reached any decision in 
either direction. As the stalemate 
leaves the Commission in a position to 
proceed with the authorisations, it 
routinely does so, sometimes in 
defiance of a clear majority of Member 
States against it. This is a 
responsibility which the Commission 
should not bear and its current 
President rightly acknowledged this in 
his inaugural address.9 Yet, instead of 
proposing a way to restore the 
credibility of the regulatory process – 
by making it more democratic and 
participatory – the Commission is 
proposing to do nothing and keep it 
‘intact’, and only to allow the Member 
States to opt out of it completely.10 
 
The following report takes the position 
that the dramatic failure of the existing 
regime is partly a matter of inadequate 
implementation of the rules, and partly 
a matter of flawed design of the 
framework itself. The problems with 
implementation - notably the 
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insufficient independence of the 
decision-makers in the authorisation 
process11 and the flaws in the 
assessments of particular GMOs – 
have been addressed by a number of 
environmental organisations on various 
occasions, so the present report will 
stay focused only on the regime as a 
whole. It will also take into account 
established practices, as helpfully 
identified in Commission’s GM 
Review. Thus, it will start with a 
general discussion of the current 
regime (Part I). In Part II the report 
will identify four major problems of 
the existing regime and en passant will 
discuss the Commission’s own 
evaluation. It will demonstrate that 
these problems make the regime 
undemocratic, unscientific and - 
without going into too many technical 
details – illegal. In Part III, the report 
will make several concrete proposals 
for legislative amendments which 
would address the identified problems, 
without needing any fundamental 
overhaul of the legislation in force. 
Finally, Part IV will critically assess 
the Commission’s own amendment 
proposal and show that it not only fails 
to solve the existing problems, but also 
creates some of its own.
Green House 
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I.	Principles	of	GMO	
regulation	in	the	EU	
 
Currently, in order to be cultivated, 
imported or marketed in any Member 
State of the EU, GMOs need prior 
authorisation.12 As appropriate for an 
integrated market where a product in 
free circulation in one Member State is 
accepted in all of the others, the 
authorisation is centralised and if 
granted is valid for the whole Union. 
The details of the procedure vary, 
depending on whether the GMO is 
meant for food or feed or for other 
purposes, but essentially involve an 
application through a national 
authority, which is then forwarded to 
all other Member States and the 
Commission. If objections are raised 
by any Member State – that is always – 
the application is referred to a 
specialised agency – the European 
Food Safety Authority (EFSA)13 to 
conduct a scientific assessment of its 
safety for human and animal health or 
the environment. The legislation in 
force provides quite precise and 
comprehensive guidelines on what the 
assessment should include; the 
Commission may ask additional 
questions; and national agencies can 
provide additional information too - so 
that ideally EFSA’s opinion takes into 
account all the scientific information 
currently available. In cases of dispute 
meetings with national experts and 
possibly stakeholders are called where 
participants are expected to settle all 
the differences and reach an 
undisputable and ‘objective’ 
conclusion. Needless to say, in GMO 
matters this rarely happens. 
 
Having completed the assessment, and 
taken into account any such 
information, EFSA produces a final 
opinion, which is forwarded to the 
Commission. On the basis of this the 
Commission makes a recommendation 
to a special Scientific Committee, 
consisting of experts from national 
ministries – the so-called comitology 
procedure – on whether or not to 
authorise the GMO. The voting rules in 
the committee mirror those in the 
Council. Although it consists of 
experts, these are not expected to be 
independent but to take instructions 
from their ministers, so this procedure 
can be perceived as a layer of political 
control.14 In theory, the committee 
should be informed by EFSA’s opinion 
but the final decision is their own; its 
members are free to vote either way 
and can chose to deviate from the 
recommendation. In general, 
comitology is famously consensual and 
almost all proposals are eventually 
adopted.15 In stark contrast, when 
deciding on GMO authorisations, the 
committees have never managed to 
reach any decision either way and the 
GM Review now recognises officially 
that this layer of control is permanently 
blocked. In case of a stalemate, the 
comitology rules allow the 
Commission to make a decision; in 
GMO cases it often delays but 
eventually grants the authorisation. 
While the role of EFSA is supposed to 
be strictly advisory, with the 
committees of national representatives 
and the Commission in turn 
responsible for any decision, because 
of the stalemate in the former and the 
deference of the latter, the opinion of 
the scientific advisor effectively 
prejudices the ultimate authorisation.16  
 
The EU system makes use of a scheme 
very common in risk regulation 
worldwide, which is reliant on the 
functional and institutional distinction 
between risk assessment and risk 
management. The former is considered 
to be an objective process that can be 
entrusted to unaccountable expert 
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bodies. Only the latter is believed to be 
a matter of judgement and properly 
assigned to more responsible 
authorities. Risk itself is perceived as 
the probability of a certain hazard 
occurring multiplied by the magnitude 
of the harm it can cause. It is 
noteworthy that this understanding of 
risk takes no account of the extent of 
the exposure to the hazard. Instead, the 
assessment seeks to identify a ‘safe’ 
threshold below which the product 
being evaluated has no adverse 
effects.17  This approach is highly 
questionable, as the test conditions 
where the thresholds are identified are 
not always representative of the actual 
conditions where the hazard may 
occur. Yet, as the estimation of 
exposure is increasingly difficult given 
the variety of real life situations, it is 
widely used nevertheless.18 Another 
criticism is that this system treats 
equally localised risks, whose impact 
does not spread, and risks with 
propagating impacts, which may cause 
irreversible systemic failure.19 
Complete destruction of a system is 
not the same as the destruction of one 
tenth of ten systems, so even if the 
probability of the former is extremely 
low, responsible policy makers should 
take whatever measures are necessary 
to avoid it.20 Moreover, the existing 
approach to risk assessment is severely 
criticised even from a more traditional 
perspective. For example, a recent 
report commissioned by the European 
Environmental Agency (EEA) 
lamented the fact that risk assessment 
is not governed by the precautionary 
principle at all and that the same 
institutional patterns that led to 
disasters like asbestos, benzene and 
mad cow disease remain unchanged.21  
 
Notwithstanding such criticisms, the 
legislation in force adopts this 
orthodox model of risk analysis. Thus, 
the expert body – EFSA in our case – 
is expected to make a precise and 
neutral assessment of the risk, which 
will inform the political institutions – 
the comitology committee and the 
Commission in turn - in making their 
choice. The academic literature has 
long since questioned whether such 
neat division is possible in practice.22  
When it comes to novel technologies, 
data is by definition scarce, so even the 
most up to date science cannot be 
conclusive in its estimates. It has been 
observed that risk assessors, and EFSA 
in particular, are intolerant of 
uncertainty and, following the 
principle of parsimony, tend to 
interpret lack of evidence as evidence 
for lack of effect.23 Although the 
experts readily acknowledge the limits 
of their knowledge – academic papers 
usually start with a number of 
disclaimers – the employment of 
science is paradoxically understood as 
a way to provide certainty, neutrality 
and objectivity to the assessment. As 
the potential hazards cannot usually be 
established with sufficient rigour, 
scientific advisers tend to conclude that 
there is no evidence that any potential 
harm is caused by the product so it 
appears to be ‘safe’. The problem with 
this separation of tasks is that the 
delivery of such an opinion by the 
assessor makes the risk manager 
redundant. Indeed, if a product is ‘safe’ 
there is no risk to be managed; on the 
other hand, if its safety is 
acknowledged to be uncertain, rarely 
will a politician authorise it under any 
circumstances. In both cases, the risk 
manager is placed in the position of 
rubber-stamping the conclusions of the 
risk assessor. This could still make 
some sense if risk assessment could be 
used as a neutral instrument to assert 
that “the risk of doing x is y per cent” 
or to specify risk thresholds which are 
not arbitrary. However, this is rarely 
possible, and risk assessment 
inevitably involves a considerable 
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measure of judgement; accordingly, 
the assessor inevitably enjoys certain 
discretion.24 EFSA, for instance, 
cannot, and as a matter of practice does 
not, estimate that the risk of horizontal 
transfer of antibiotic resistance 
amounts to a certain percentage which 
can be communicated to the 
Commission.25 All they can do is state 
what is in their opinion likely or 
unlikely to happen. 
 
While the present author shares the 
view that the established system of 
regulation of risk is inappropriate for 
the case of uncertainty the present 
report will not argue for adoption of an 
alternative paradigm of the kind 
proposed by Read or Chapman. 
Instead, it will take the existing regime 
for granted and analyse the troubles it 
creates on its own terms.  
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II.	Flaws	of	the	existing	
GMO	regime	
 
 
The current GMO regime raises the 
following major legal problems. First, 
it operates in violation of the non-
delegation doctrine, as established by 
the Court of Justice (the Court, ECJ) in 
Meroni.26  Second, the Commission 
fails to discharge its duty to take into 
account the ‘other legitimate factors’ in 
contravention of the explicit provisions 
of the Food and Feed Regulation.27 
Third, the Commission is effectively 
allowed to adopt a decision for GMO 
authorisation against clear positions of 
an overwhelming majority of Member 
States and of the European Parliament 
(EP) to the contrary, in contravention 
of the principles of democracy set out 
in Art 10 of the Treaty on the 
European Union (TEU) and, in 
particular, contrary to the specific 
terms of recital 14 of Regulation 
182/2011.28 Finally, the existing 
regime defies the precautionary 
principle and jeopardises the high level 
of protection of health and 
environment required by Art. 3 (3) 
TEU. These problems will be 
addressed respectively in the following 
sections. 
 
1)		Delegation	and	
Responsibility	of	the	
Commission29	
 
As was elaborated in Part I, the precise 
numerical assessment of risk, 
understood as probability times 
magnitude, is impossible; what risk 
assessors and EFSA in particular 
usually do is to state what, in their 
view, is likely or unlikely to happen. 
Thus, EFSA’s assessments, even if 
they are fully independent and 
unbiased, inevitably involve a measure 
of discretion which is not immediately 
obvious. This condition, however, does 
not sit well together with the non-
delegation principle of EU law.  
In one of its earliest judgments – 
Meroni v. High Authority, the Court of 
Justice of the EU (ECJ) sought to limit 
the possibility for major Union 
institutions to delegate their powers to 
other bodies and held that it can be 
done only if the exercise of these 
powers is subject to (1) strict criteria 
and (2) effective oversight. It is largely 
because of this doctrine that the 
European agencies as a rule have 
modest decision-making powers; they 
mostly gather information and provide 
expertise for the benefit of the 
Commission, Council or the EP who 
remain responsible for the ultimate 
decision. Thus, even though powerful 
European agencies have mushroomed 
during the last two decades, they do 
not have regulatory powers 
comparable to those of their American 
counterparts; if such powers were 
granted, they would most probably be 
found illegal in the European 
constitutional framework. When the 
Meroni conditions are applied to 
authorisations of GMOs, it follows that 
the Commission (and the comitology 
committees) may be required to take 
into account the opinion of EFSA, but 
should not lose the power to make the 
ultimate choice themselves. In theory, 
this is what the current GMO 
legislation provides for too. 
 
However, the limits to delegation are 
compounded by the increasingly 
common requirements for the Union 
institutions to base their decisions on 
scientific evidence. The role of 
scientific advice was clarified by the 
General Court in Pfizer.30 This 
decision is generally understood to 
have severely limited the opportunity 
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of the administration to deviate from 
the received scientific advice – it can 
do so only if it can base its decision on 
alternative scientific evidence of equal 
standing. When applied to GMO 
authorisations it follows that if it is to 
remain compliant with the 
requirements for scientific justification 
set in Pfizer, the Commission must 
either defer to the advice of EFSA or 
outsmart its advisor.31 Whenever the 
Commission cannot do the latter it will 
be unable to make a choice of its own, 
and this amounts to impermissible 
empowerment of the advisory agency, 
which under the Meroni doctrine is 
unlawful. Thus, the current GMO 
regime forces the Commission to 
violate either the legislative 
requirement for science-based 
authorisations, or the constitutional 
requirement for non-delegation. As the 
former is more apparent than the latter 
– to industry lawyers in particular – it 
is small wonder that the Commission 
always chooses to commit the latter 
violation. 
 
Indeed, in its GM Review the 
Commission explicitly states that it 
considers itself unable to exercise any 
measure of judgement of its own and is 
under legal obligation always to defer 
to the recommendations of its 
advisor.32 Yet, the GM Review stops 
short of making the obvious conclusion 
from the facts it has stated: that if the 
risk management stage is inoperative, 
this makes the risk assessor – EFSA – 
the decision-maker by default. In 
theory, this condition might be 
remedied by a layer of political control 
through the comitology. But as the GM 
Review now admits, the control that 
national experts were meant to exercise 
over the authorisation process does not 
function, so all of the decisions are 
adopted “without the support of the 
Member States’ committee opinion.”33 
As long as the mechanism for 
supervision of the authorisation is 
effectively blocked, with the 
Commission considering itself bound 
to defer to EFSA’s opinion, the latter 
becomes the risk manager de facto. 
This is a clear violation of the 
Treaties, at least as they are 
interpreted in Meroni. 
 
In the view of the present author, 
urgent legislative action is necessary to 
amend the authorisation process, and 
Part III of this report will propose a 
number of specific changes which 
could help. Those which are aimed to 
deal with the problem with discretion 
will be briefly sketched here. The first 
possible remedy is for the voting rules 
in the said committees to be amended 
in a way to ensure that they are able 
always to reach a decision, despite the 
unrelenting division between the 
Member States. In any event, in light 
of their persistent failure to exercise 
any meaningful control over GMO 
authorisations, the comitology 
committees should not remain the only 
source of democratic control in the 
process. Another way is to restore the 
responsibility of the Commission as 
the default risk manager, by clearly 
stating in the relevant secondary law 
that it may deviate from the opinion of 
its advisor.34 The third way to avoid 
the undue fettering to the received 
advice is to re-emphasise the need to 
consider the ‘other legitimate factors’. 
To allay any concerns that in deviating 
from EFSA’s opinion the Commission 
may act arbitrarily, it could simply be 
required to justify its decision to do so 
by taking into account other 
circumstances, which, by their nature, 
cannot be adequately considered by 
EFSA. This would limit the conferral 
of too much discretion on the 
Commission while also addressing 
another problem of the existing 
regime, which is discussed in the next 
section. Yet another way is for the 
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Commission to be required to take into 
account the stated positions of the 
Member States, and/or any relevant 
resolutions of the European 
Parliament.35 In a recent example, a 
decision to authorise cultivation of 
Maize Pioneer 1507 was opposed by 
19 Member States with only 5 in 
favour. The predominant position 
could hardly be any clearer.  
 
This section has demonstrated that the 
existing regime for authorisations of 
GMOs stands in violation of the 
primary law as interpreted by the ECJ. 
The following section will show that 
by failing to take into account the 
‘other legitimate factors’ which are 
deemed “non-scientific”, the system 
is also undemocratic and unscientific 
(sic!).  
 
2)		Narrow	basis	of	
authorisation	decisions		
 
The present GMO regime was adopted 
after years of intense controversy and 
institutional deadlock. It was assumed 
that this ‘political’ controversy might 
be reduced if the decisions were taken 
on a purely ‘scientific’ basis.36 This is 
not surprising, indeed, the Union itself 
was created to take certain decisions 
out of reach of national(ist) politicians 
and entrust them to experts. In line 
with this well-established tradition, the 
authorisations were effectively taken 
away from the political institutions and 
entrusted to a specialised supranational 
authority, as already discussed at 
length in the preceding section. This 
scientific underpinning was expected 
to bring about agreement at the 
political level. However, the 
established expert body – EFSA – 
failed to gain credibility and provide 
an ‘objective’ basis for broad 
agreement as had been hoped.37 On the 
contrary - more than a decade since the 
adoption of the present rules, Member 
States are as divided as ever, with an 
overwhelming majority against 
cultivation of GMOs – in stark contrast 
with EFSA’s opinions, which have 
been persistently favourable.38 The 
biotech industry adamantly attributes 
this to ‘politicisation’ and ‘public 
opposition to science’; however 
nothing can be further from the truth.39 
The view advanced by this report, and 
widely shared by environmentalists of 
all stripes, is that the problem is in the 
incomplete design of the risk analysis 
and the exclusion of contextual 
feedback in the assessment, as 
elaborated below.40   
 
The root of the controversy is not the 
regime’s reliance on scientific 
assessment, but in the narrow 
understanding of ‘science’ enshrined in 
the regulations and at the same time 
the overtaxing of this science with 
more than it can deliver. In the way 
science is defined by EFSA, most of 
the concerns of the citizens, and 
therefore of the Member States, are 
made irrelevant for the assessment of 
new GMO varieties.  As Kritikos puts 
it: 
 
the manifestations of the risks 
and benefits of genetic 
engineering acquire 
socioeconomic forms. These … 
include, inter alia, concerns 
about fairness, distribution of 
technological risks and benefits 
and consumer choice, the 
potential economic risks of the 
industrial capture of both 
biosafety research and 
biotechnology patenting, the 
potential dependence of local 
farmers on international GM-
grain suppliers and industrial 
expertise, the effects of the 
commercial application of 
agricultural biotechnology 
Green House 
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upon organic dairying, the 
sustainability of rural 
economies and livelihoods, the 
preservation of traditional 
agronomic practices and the 
safeguarding of the existence of 
small farm units.41  
 
By leaving such concerns outside of 
the risk analysis, the current regime 
renders the analysis irrelevant for the 
respective citizens so it becomes 
impossible to gain credibility and 
legitimacy with regard to them.42 In its 
GM Proposal the Commission goes as 
far as acknowledging the importance 
of the ‘other factors’ for the states 
opposing the technology and 
recognises the regime’s failure to take 
them into consideration, yet insists on 
preserving it intact. This is puzzling: as 
‘guardian of the Treaties’, the 
Commission is expected to seek ways 
to improve the credibility of the 
established Paneuropean regulatory 
regimes that it manages, rather than 
propose national opt-outs when they 
fail. In the view of the present author, 
in order to gain credibility, the GMO 
regime ought to broaden the scope of 
the relevant considerations. While in 
numerous other areas the EU makes 
every effort to reconnect to its citizens 
in order to overcome the existing 
democratic deficit, it is inexplicable 
why in this area the Commission 
remains committed to the exclusion of 
a number of the concerns of these 
citizens as inappropriate and 
‘political’. 
 
Theoretically, ‘non-scientific factors’ 
are recognised as a legitimate basis for 
the decision on whether or not to 
authorise a new GMO variety for 
cultivation or marketing.43 Thus, 
various stakeholders may be concerned 
about its socio-economic impacts, cost 
of co-existence imposed upon 
conventional farmers, and effect on 
national health and dietary policies, as 
well as about the preservation of 
existing farming practices and 
consumption patterns, preserving local 
skills and bottom-up innovation, 
environmental policy goals, 
agricultural policy, town and country 
planning, etc. These are compounded 
by concerns about the ‘lock-in’ effect 
of the adoption of any new technology. 
For example, as GMOs tend to breed 
resistance in pests and weeds – 
according to one estimate 
“superweeds” now infest 61 million 
acres (25 million ha) of US farmland44 
- so a ‘safe’ herbicide-resistant crop 
locks farmers, biotech industry and 
regulators in a cycle of competition 
between evolution and innovation.45 
The self-sustaining growth of demand 
for pesticides and herbicides which has 
thus been sparked is welcome for the 
industry but progressively increases 
the effect on the environment well 
beyond the initial estimates. Similarly, 
when a GMO becomes widespread in 
the food chain, it becomes increasingly 
difficult both for the industry and for 
the consumer to opt out of its use – for 
example it is already quite difficult, 
and increasingly more costly, to buy 
soybeans which are not genetically 
engineered anywhere outside of the 
EU.  Thus, even if the availability of 
GMOs is often cast as increasing 
‘consumer choice’, in the long run it 
risks actually reducing it.46  
 
The importance of these factors for the 
legitimacy of any authorisation is now, 
at last, recognised by the Commission 
in its GM Review. However, it admits 
that it does not assess or take into 
account any of them. This clearly 
contravenes the existing legislation, 
namely Recital 32 of the Food and 
Feed Regulation, which stipulates that 
“scientific risk assessment alone 
cannot provide all the information … 
[and] other legitimate factors … must 
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be taken into account.” In the same 
vein, its Art. 7 (1) requires the 
Commission to take into account the 
other legitimate factors along with the 
opinion of EFSA when making its 
proposal to the committee of national 
experts. Yet the Commission does not 
give a scintilla of an account of why it 
has not made any attempt to comply. 
This apparent abdication from its 
responsibility is even more puzzling 
when compared to its ambitious stance 
towards assessment of the impact of a 
great variety of effects of its proposals 
in all other areas. With the proposed 
amendment, the Commission seeks to 
absolve itself from the responsibility 
for any consideration of such impacts 
even at the risk management stage.  
The regime should be amended in the 
opposite direction – the Commission’s 
responsibility as a risk manager ought 
to be restored, with the final decision 
being taken with regard to all relevant 
factors. A Paneuropean decision which 
defines what is ‘safe’ for health or the 
environment cannot be determined 
solely by the scientists themselves. 
Science, properly understood, cannot 
be equated with the opinion of a tiny 
group of experts, all specialised in a 
single narrow field and inevitably with 
a background in the industry they are 
called for to regulate.47 Rather, science 
must inform the citizens of Europe, 
who should have the power to decide - 
via the established democratic 
processes at national and European 
level and on the basis of all factors 
they find relevant.  
 
On the other hand, even “safety” issues 
cannot be adequately estimated 
without taking into account socio-
economic considerations, notably the 
scale of the projected deliberate release 
of GMOs into the environment. As was 
pointed out by one dissent to the EFSA 
opinion on the safety of the Amflora 
potato, even very low probabilities of 
horizontal gene transfer should raise 
concerns when the number of incidents 
grows.48 Yet the existing system is 
geared to take into account the number 
of cysts laboratory rats would develop, 
but not the number of potatoes being 
planted. As already mentioned in Part 
I, risk analysis does not take account of 
the extensiveness of the use of a 
technology, and EFSA does not have 
the capacity to consider the potential 
spread of the GMO cultivation or 
consumption. Nor can it even begin to 
consider potential systemic harm 
should resistance to certain antibiotic 
spread into the environment.49 Note 
that the argument here is not that 
EFSA’s opinion should have been 
negative – though in the version of 
precautionary principle suggested by 
Taleb and colleagues50 it ought to have 
been so. The point of importance here 
is only that EFSA by design does not 
have the capacity even to begin to 
consider such issues, but that these 
questions are critical for the 
assessment. Yet as EFSA’s opinion is 
the only one that counts as science 
under the current regime, they are 
bound to remain excluded.51  Another 
problem of the current safety 
assessments is that safety is estimated 
with regard to the product being used 
“as prescribed by the label”. 
Obviously, this does not take into 
account actual farming practices, nor 
the available capacity for control. To 
the extent that these practices deviate 
from the prescription, the assessment 
of safety will be inaccurate, sometimes 
significantly so. Environmental safety 
cannot be soundly assessed 
independent of farming practices, 
which in turn depend, especially in the 
longer run, on a wide variety of socio-
economic, cultural and even 
psychological practices. Thus, besides 
being undemocratic, by exclusion of 
the “other” factors, the system 
becomes also unscientific. 
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Paradoxically, the inclusion of “non-
scientific” factors does not make the 
system less scientific; on the contrary, 
it is a condition for the science to be 
sound. This is recognised in other areas 
and by other agencies; for example the 
European Environmental Agency 
stated that lay knowledge is 
complementary and sometimes has 
firmer grounding in real world 
operational conditions.52 Thus, in the 
view of the present author, the 
Commission is able and should be 
required to give a clear mandate to 
EFSA to consider the safety of each 
GMO variety with regard to the 
projected use and anticipated changes 
in consumption patterns and farming 
practices.  
 
Obviously, even if EFSA were 
mandated to take into account the other 
factors which are relevant for the 
safety assessment, it may not always 
be able adequately to do so because of 
the narrow expertise of the members of 
its specialist panels. Currently only 
four out of 15 members of EFSA’s 
management board are supposed to 
have background in organisations 
representing consumer and other 
interests53, which is far from optimal. 
There are no such requirements for the 
members of the GMO panel, which is 
dominated by microbiologists and 
genetic engineers, with only a minority 
of people with backgrounds in other 
sciences. This expertise must be 
diversified as proposed in Part III 
below. Yet it should be obvious that no 
amount of diversity of expertise can 
substitute for the voice of actual 
citizens. The tolerable level of risk can 
be properly estimated only via robust 
democratic participation of the 
stakeholders to which we shall turn 
shortly. Finally, both EFSA and the 
Commission should be clearly required 
when balancing all relevant factors not 
to give any preference to those which 
are measurable and quantifiable. The 
differently developed  methodologies 
of the scientific disciplines is not a 
reason for differentiated treatment of 
their subject matter. The Commission’s 
apparent preference for measurable 
and quantifiable forms of knowledge54 
may seem necessary in order to avoid 
appearance of arbitrariness, yet it has 
little basis even under the existing 
secondary law and should be ruled out 
explicitly.    
 
The persistent failure of the current 
regime to account for the ‘other 
factors’ creates two further problems – 
dependency on the industry knowledge 
and redundancy of public 
consultations. First, given the 
“industry-driven character of biosafety 
research”,55 by making narrowly 
defined safety considerations pivotal 
for authorisation, the regime privileges 
the industry over all the other 
stakeholders. While the applicant is in 
possession of the data from all trials of 
the respective GMO variety, 
everybody else, including EFSA, is 
heavily dependent on his 
information.56 All that those 
stakeholders wishing to contest the 
authorisation can do is to challenge the 
industry information, but such 
stakeholders are generally not in a 
position to possess data of their own. 
So they must fit their own arguments 
within the narrow framework 
established by the applicant. For 
example, the concern of farmers that 
the spread of a GM variety would 
increase their dependency on a certain 
herbicide57 cannot be taken into 
account unless they can prove the 
precise amount of damage to the 
environment of this herbicide. Their 
dependency would be set aside as a 
non-scientific issue. If the 
authorisation regime is to be made 
legitimate, the concerns of each group 
of stakeholders should be considered 
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on its own terms, and farmers should 
not be required to reframe their 
concerns in the only terms that are 
currently acceptable – those of the 
industry. Thus, stakeholders should not 
merely be given opportunity to 
participate, but enabled to do so in a 
wider and open-ended discussion on 
their own terms.58 As a general rule, 
independence is achieved by inclusion 
of all sides as co-equal, and by 
allowing everyone to argue on their 
own terms, rather than by exclusion of 
some claims as ‘unscientific’ or 
requiring some stakeholders to adopt 
the discourse of another.  
 
The second related problem is that the 
narrow framing of the questions makes 
the public consultations – mandated by 
recital 10 and Art. 9 of the Deliberate 
Release Directive59 and Art. 6(7) of the 
Food and Feed Regulation – all but 
meaningless. It is recognised that 
participation is especially important in 
cases where the level of uncertainty, 
complexity and/or ambiguity is higher, 
so that a greater variety of actors needs 
to be involved.60 While the current 
approach to participation allows for a 
wide variety of participants at various 
points in the process – indeed anyone 
may submit an opinion via an online 
platform – the general public is invited 
to speak, but cannot be heard. To the 
extent that the Commission, by its own 
admission, is basing its decisions 
exclusively on the opinions of EFSA’s 
GMO panel, which in turn views 
public comments incompatible with 
the “objective” character of the 
assessments,61 the arguments are 
certain to be ruled out as irrelevant. 
Indeed, many studies of public 
participation confirm that the 
Commission’s attempts to encourage 
public participation do not provide a 
way for representation of any groups 
outside of techno-scientific 
communities.62 This redundant 
participation to the exclusion of the 
actual concerns of the stakeholders is 
what makes EFSA – and by 
implication the existing regime – 
“insensitive and far-removed from 
reality.”63  
 
While the rigour of the scientific 
method is most welcome in the area of 
risk regulation, its essence is 
reductionist: in order to estimate 
certain causal effect, the risk assessor 
reduces the immense variability of 
natural and social systems to a few 
variables which are easily mapped, 
modelled and measured.64 As 
Chapman points out, the test 
conditions have to be controlled and 
standardised to enable replicability of 
the result; this makes the conclusions 
more rigorous scientifically, but less 
representative of the actual conditions 
prevailing where the substance will be 
used.65 If the conclusions are to be 
valid outside the lab, account should 
also be taken of the circumstances in 
the real world, and the involvement of 
the stakeholders is a way to achieve 
this. Besides making the assessment 
more scientific, this would also 
generate trust in the decisions based 
upon it.   
 
In the view of the present author, the 
proposed substantive engagement and 
inclusion of citizens’ concern in the 
process of authorisations of GMO 
would not change fundamentally the 
nature of the current regime; indeed, 
the suggested amendments are needed 
to avoid the violations of the existing 
rules which persist in practice. The 
proposals in that regard, elaborated in 
detail in Part III below, would not 
make the regime less scientific. The 
opposite is true – they would make the 
scientific assessments more sound and 
closer to the real world. They would 
abolish, however, the normative 
authority which the current regime 
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accords to the statements of certain 
scientists and the opposition between 
‘science’ and ‘democracy’ which this 
generates. Neither would the proposals 
undermine EFSA’s independence. On 
the contrary: the current insulation 
undermines its independence as it 
renders it solely dependent on the 
expertise developed by the industry.  
 
While the GMO regime, and risk 
regulation in general, must be 
democratised by increased 
participation and inclusive integration 
along the lines suggested in this and 
the preceding section, the following 
section addresses another problem of 
the existing regime and suggests a 
more direct way to provide for 
democratic control of the GMO 
authorisations.   
 
3)	Excessive	supranationalism		
 
Further to the violation of the non-
delegation principle discussed earlier, 
the current GMO regime raises a 
related concern about the appropriate 
institutional balance. It is commonly 
accepted that the balance of powers 
between the main Union institutions 
reflects the balance between the Union 
itself and the Member States. By 
making the Commission the decision 
maker by default in the matter of GMO 
authorisation, the balance is shifted 
towards supranationalism, which in 
this case is uniquely unchecked by any 
of the other political authorities, in 
contravention to the established 
constitutional principles of the Union. 
The adoption of decisions by the 
Commission despite the clear position 
of the Member States against them also 
defies the existing consensual culture, 
whereby institutions follow an 
unwritten rule to abstain from 
decisions on sensitive matters until a 
compromise solution is found. Member 
States are usually portrayed by the 
biotech industry as ‘stubborn’,66 but 
this criticism ignores the fact that the 
regime is meant to allow for the 
Member States to take into account the 
concerns of their citizens. In the view 
of the present author, the persistent 
opposition to authorisations is a 
symptom of the failure of the existing 
system to produce convincing evidence 
and to generate trust in its integrity. 
The purpose of the adopted mechanism 
of decision by committees of national 
experts – the comitology – is to 
mediate between the supranational and 
intergovernmental principles in the EU 
constitutional system. The comitology 
is celebrated as a successful model for 
consensus-building,67 yet in this case, 
as was finally admitted by the 
Commission itself, it fails to do so, and 
the committees fail to reach any 
decision either way. This failure 
uniquely empowers the Commission to 
decide as it pleases.68 The European 
Parliament is uniquely ignored – 
elsewhere, even if it is only consulted, 
its resolutions would be expected to 
carry some persuasive force. Instead, 
in the GM Review the Commission 
explicitly states that it is “unable” to 
take into account EP’s opinion, as it 
feels bound to follow the assessments 
delivered by EFSA and nothing else. 
There are few other cases where the 
Commission is empowered to decide 
alone, without any form of control via 
comitology or opinions of the 
Parliament, and these are explicitly 
provided for by the legislation. The 
unique situation in the GMO area of 
empowerment by default requires 
exceptional measures for the 
constitutional balance to be urgently 
restored. As the root of this problem is 
the persistent stalemate in the 
committees, one obvious solution is for 
the required majority to be relaxed and 
the national representatives to be 
allowed to adopt decisions by simple 
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majority.  The other way to restore 
political control is to provide for some 
measure of involvement by the 
European Parliament.69 Specific 
proposals with that regard will be 
made in Part III below.  
 
4)	Precautionary	principle	
rendered	inoperative			
 
We have already seen in Part I above 
that even though the GMO 
authorisation process is allegedly 
compliant with the precautionary 
principle (Recital 8 and Art. 1 & 4 of 
the Deliberative Release Directive), the 
latter is rendered inoperative. This 
amounts to a violation of Art. 191 (3) 
of the Treaty on Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) and of the 
requirement of Art. 3 (3) TEU to 
achieve a high level of protection of 
human health and the environment. 
 
The precautionary principle is meant to 
correct classical risk analysis and 
empower the Union institutions to take 
action in cases where the analysis 
cannot deliver certain outcomes.70 
However, the Communication on the 
Precautionary Principle71 adopted an 
interpretation that incorporates the 
principle within the risk analysis and 
the Union judicature, notably in the 
Pfizer case, read this interpretation into 
the law. This brought in “the largely 
discredited reliance on the expert-
centric probabilistic techniques for 
regulation of new and controversial 
technologies though the back door.”72 
In the view of the present author, this 
would be compatible with the Treaty 
objective of a high level of protection 
if, in the established system of strict 
division between risk assessment and 
risk management, the principle is 
applied in both phases. As elaborated 
already in Part I, in the current regime 
of firm separation between risk 
assessment and risk management, 
precaution is confined to risk 
management only, apparently to 
preserve the alleged scientific 
objectivity of risk assessment. 
Paradoxically, even though 
precautionary action is taken out of the 
hands of experts, their role as assessors 
gives them “the gate-keeping function 
to trigger precaution.”73 Indeed, the 
precautionary principle is hardly ever 
mentioned in the authorisation 
dossiers. One is justified in wondering 
where the difference is between 
ordinary risk analysis, which does not 
claim to be precautionary, and the 
existing system, which does.74 As the 
cited provisions of the Treaties make 
the precautionary principle a matter 
of law, the GMO regime, which 
renders the principle redundant on a 
permanent basis, stands in violation 
of the primary law.75 
 
Notwithstanding the advisability of the 
more radical alternatives advocated by 
Taleb and colleagues and by Chapman 
mentioned earlier, the precautionary 
principle may easily be made 
operational once again within the 
current system. As Quist and 
colleagues explain: 
 
precaution has a role to play in 
the scientific risk assessment 
itself in two fundamental ways. 
First, applying precaution 
within risk assessment practice 
also means applying more 
robust scientific standards — 
that is, the need for precaution 
and the need for scientific rigor 
are not incompatible but 
complementary. Second, 
particularly when testing 
hypotheses, value judgements 
within science practice may be 
informed by precaution, 
including levels of evidence, 
directions of error, and by 
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acknowledging and 
communicating what we know, 
do not know, and cannot know 
with existing methodologies. 
The formal acknowledgment of 
uncertainties and the choice of 
error type from the risk 
assessment and their 
communication to decision-
makers are key components of 
rigorous science-based risk 
assessment.76   
 
To restore the role of the precautionary 
principle – in GMO regulation and 
elsewhere – by extending its 
application to the risk assessment 
stage, it must be recognised that it is 
possible for the same scientific data 
about the likelihood of certain risk to 
be interpreted differently. The 
reclassification of Roundup™ as 
possibly carcinogenic for humans by 
an agency of the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) on the basis of 
the same data used by the US 
Environment Protection Agency (EPA) 
to authorise it is just the most recent 
example.77 An earlier instance, which 
raised a major controversy in the 
course of the authorisation of the 
Amflora potato, was of two antibiotics 
considered to be unimportant by EFSA 
but important by the WHO and the 
European Medicines Agency.78 It must 
be formally acknowledged that such 
differences are legitimate and are not a 
matter of temporary shortage of 
information. Further to this, it must be 
recognised by law that the same 
probability estimate, even if accurately 
and precisely established, may be seen 
as low by some Member States or 
Union bodies and high by other 
Member State or Union bodies. 
EFSA’s role should be limited to 
emphasising the relationships and 
highlighting the trade-offs, but it must 
be made explicit that the final 
judgement does not belong to it. As the 
interpretation of the existing data is a 
matter of choice this choice must be 
explicitly guided by the precautionary 
principle. 
 
This may be difficult under the 
existing regime, notably the 
Communication on the precautionary 
principle and the jurisprudence of the 
Union courts, but nothing in the 
Treaties prevents an amendment of the 
secondary law in that sense. Advocate 
General Sharpston has tried to impress 
upon the Court of Justice that “new 
conclusions drawn from existing data 
may constitute new scientific evidence 
within the meaning of Art. [114(5)] of 
the Treaty.”79 The Court did not follow 
her opinion, and adopted stricter 
requirements for “newness” of the 
evidence. If this is the correct 
understanding of the applicable 
secondary law, then it must be urgently 
amended to restore the functionality of 
the precautionary principle so that the 
Treaty objective of a high level of 
protection is not jeopardised any 
further.   
 
Having exposed the major legal 
problems which the existing regime 
creates, in the next part this report will 
make several specific proposals for 
amending the legislation currently in 
force, which if adopted can alleviate 
these problems.  
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III.	Proposals	for	changes	in	
the	secondary	legislation		
 
As elaborated in the previous part of 
the report, under the current GMO 
authorisation regime the Commission 
is obliged, according to its own 
understanding of the case law, to defer 
to the conclusions of EFSA. It declines 
the responsibility to weigh 
controversial evidence itself and 
uncritically accepts the weighing done 
by its advisor. It also refuses to take 
into consideration the other relevant 
factors, in violation of the regulations 
in force. To remedy this situation, 
which as established above is both 
undemocratic and illegal, a series of 
amendments to the existing rules will 
be considered. They are intended (1) to 
restore the responsibility of the 
Commission to take a decision based 
on its own judgement of the contested 
evidence, rather than rubber-stamping 
the received advice; (2) to strengthen 
the Commission’s responsibility, 
whenever the contingencies of the 
authorisation procedure place it in a 
position to decide, to ensure that other 
factors are taken into account as 
required by the Food and Feed 
Regulation; and (3) to restore the 
functionality of the committees of 
national experts in the authorisation 
process. It should be borne in mind 
that in this extremely sensitive area the 
national experts sitting on these 
committees are invariably acting upon 
clear instructions from their ministers, 
which are supposed to be responsive to 
the concerns of the citizens. The 
decision-making mechanism thus 
established, if it were functioning as 
intended, would enjoy a much higher 
degree of legitimacy than the 
Commission when acting by default., It 
is therefore essential that the current 
situation whereby the committee level 
cannot ever reach a decision either way 
be remedied. In addition, or as an 
alternative, the possibility for (4) 
strengthening of the role of the 
European Parliament should be 
considered. Currently the EP has no 
part in the GMO authorisation process 
and in comitology in general, but the 
old regulatory procedure with scrutiny 
under Council Decision 1999/468 
(now repealed) could be a workable 
model, for the GMO area at least. 
Further, (5) amendments strengthening 
the role of the precautionary principle 
should be considered, as in practice it 
is rendered inoperative. Finally, it is 
suggested (6) to diversify the expertise 
employed by EFSA and (7) to enhance 
the rules for participation of other 
interested parties, which would have 
the additional advantage of reducing 
the currently disproportionate 
influence of the industry on the 
process.   
 
1)	Restoring	the	responsibility	of	
the	Commission	
 
a) Margin of discretion 
 
The following recital should be added 
to the Food and Feed Regulation: 
 
Whereas the decision for 
authorisation of new GMO 
varieties must be informed by 
the scientific risk assessment 
conducted by EFSA, it is 
nevertheless recognised that 
any such assessment inevitably 
involves a degree of judgement; 
and while the Commission is 
bound to take into account the 
opinion of EFSA, it is by no 
means bound to accept it. On 
the contrary, it is responsible 
for making a reasoned and 
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informed decision, on the basis 
of its own weighting of all 
information which is made 
available to it and in 
compliance with the 
precautionary principle.  
 
The purpose of this amendment would 
be to acknowledge that all stages of the 
risk analysis, including risk 
assessment, involve a certain measure 
of discretion and it is incumbent upon 
the Commission to make the final 
judgement, which must be informed by 
the opinion of the scientific advisor, 
but should not be prejudiced by it. In 
the view of the present author, the 
proposed recital is just stating the 
obvious and is in full conformity with 
the legislation already in force. Yet, it 
calls for a radical departure from the 
way the Commission currently 
understands its function, unquestioned 
in its GM Review: that its discretion is 
limited and that it is obliged to follow 
the received advice.  
 
b) Recognition of uncertainty 
 
The following paragraph should be 
added at the end of Annex II of the 
Deliberate Release Directive: 
 
E. Without prejudice to the 
employment of the most 
comprehensive and rigorous 
scientific methodology for 
assessment of the effects as 
required by the preceding 
paragraphs, it is recognised 
that all conclusions about the 
likelihood of adverse effects 
involve a great measure of 
judgement. Since the accurate 
measurement even of known 
adverse effects is often 
impossible, it is therefore 
recognised that all such 
judgements are made on the 
balance of evidence and 
different authorities may 
legitimately disagree in their 
weighting of the same evidence. 
 
It is further acknowledged that 
the effect of novel technologies 
when introduced in complex 
systems is inherently uncertain, 
and the lack of evidence for 
certain effect cannot be taken 
as evidence for lack of effect.  
 
The purpose of this amendment is the 
same as that of the amendment detailed 
in 1) above, with regard to the 
environmental risk assessment (ERA). 
It would allow the Commission to take 
a different view from EFSA, and also 
to national authorities to remain in 
disagreement with both EFSA and the 
Commission. If it is acknowledged that 
assessment is a matter of balancing, it 
would become all too obvious that the 
judgement belongs to the Commission, 
or the other accountable authorities as 
per the proposals below.  
 
For the sake of greater visibility, this 
paragraph could also be added as a 
new recital in the preamble to the 
Deliberative Release Directive.  
 
c) Cyclical risk analysis80 
 
The following paragraph should be 
added to the recitals of the General 
Food Law81: 
 
It is recognised that a 
universally applicable estimate 
of the risks associated with a 
new technology is rarely 
possible, as the magnitude of 
the potential risk inevitably 
depends on the scale and the 
context of its use. Therefore the 
assessment of risk cannot be 
completely separated from its 
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management, but all expected 
effects of the possible adoption 
of the technology, with or 
without any risk management 
measures, must be taken into 
account in the assessment. 
  
Also Art. 5 of the Food and Feed 
Regulation should be supplemented 
with the following paragraph: 
 
The Commission, having first 
consulted the national 
authorities, and after a period 
of public consultation, shall 
provide the EFSA with detailed 
terms of reference, which 
include a broad range of 
contextual factors and 
plausible scenarios with regard 
to which the application must 
be assessed.   
 
The purpose of this amendment is to 
require risk assessment to be informed 
by “other”, especially socio-economic, 
factors, like the projected scale of use 
of the technology, farming practices 
and consumption patterns, and also by 
the change of these patterns and 
practices which the technology itself 
may be expected to bring about. An 
important implication is that when 
EFSA is required to assess the safety 
of a new GMO variety, it should not 
itself be free to determine the scope of 
its assessment and the factors which it 
will consider, but must be given 
specific terms of reference in which 
the Commission, or any of the national 
authorities, may include various public 
concerns. These should not be 
considered unscientific; contextual 
factors are taken into account by any 
good scientific research, and risk 
assessments should not be an 
exception. For example, EFSA should 
not be able to conclude that the 
probability of a GMO food conferring 
antibiotic resistance to gut bacteria is 
“small” in the abstract, but must 
consider its magnitude with regard to 
the amount consumed, and also with 
regard to the likely changes in the 
consumption patterns the authorisation 
may bring about.   
 
To be able to conduct such an 
assessment, EFSA would have to be 
provided with a broader range of 
expertise, and notably must include 
social scientists in its panels as 
suggested below.  
 
2)		Consideration	of	all	relevant	
factors		
 
Recital 32 of the Food and Feed 
Regulation should be strengthened as 
follows: 
 
It is recognised that scientific 
risk assessment alone cannot 
provide all the information on 
which a risk management 
decision should be based, and 
that other legitimate factors 
must be taken into account. 
  
Whereas a democratic society 
should be able to select the 
technologies that are going to 
be developed, adopted or 
abandoned, it is recognised 
that the safety of a new 
technology, even if undisputed, 
cannot be a conclusive reason 
for its adoption, but must be 
weighted together with the 
other values protected by the 
Treaties.  
 
This change of a recital amounts to a 
substantial departure from the existing 
regime of distorted science-based 
regulation, where experts alone are 
able to impose new technologies on 
societies, on the sole ground that they 
are considered (by the experts) as safe. 
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Yet it still fits within the overall 
framework of the existing regime, 
which currently allows that other 
legitimate factors may be considered. 
By the Commission’s own admission it 
currently fails to do so. As a result the 
text needs to be strengthened. The 
suggested version would allow 
Member States to seek annulment of a 
decision that has not considered any 
other factors at all, though the 
Commission would still enjoy wide 
discretion in the balancing of these 
factors. 
 
Recital 32, amended as suggested, 
should be followed by a new one 
stating the following: 
 
Whereas some legitimate 
considerations, which are not 
easily measured, are not given 
less weight than those which 
can be estimated precisely and 
where the unavailability or the 
impossibility of accurate 
estimation cannot be taken as 
evidence for lack of effect. 
 
A new recital should be added both to 
the Deliberative Release Directive and 
the Food and Feed Regulation 
confirming the following: 
 
It is recognised that the 
Commission has developed an 
immense capacity to assess the 
effects of its policy proposals in 
all areas of economy, society 
and the environment, and is 
therefore in a position to take 
into account a wide variety of 
other legitimate factors when 
reaching its decision as to 
whether or not to authorise the 
cultivation or marketing of new 
GMO varieties without acting 
arbitrarily. It is further 
recognised that since such 
capacity is also being 
developed by the European 
Parliament, the latter body will 
be able to hold the Commission 
to account in that regard, or 
make an informed decision of 
its own, whenever it is given a 
voice in the authorisation 
process (as proposed below).    
 
The effect of this amendment would be 
twofold. On the one hand, it is a 
necessary follow-up to the amended 
recital 32, which recognises that 
because the Commission routinely 
assesses other factors, its abdication of 
responsibility to consider them in the 
case of GMO authorisation is 
unjustified. On the other hand, it 
emphasises that the consideration of 
such factors will not render the 
decisions arbitrary. On the contrary, 
this would make the authorisation 
process more accountable.  
To ensure that these strengthened 
requirements are not ignored, as they 
currently are, Art 4 (3) of the Food and 
Feed Regulation should be amended as 
follows: 
 
No GMO for food use or food 
referred to in Art 3(1) shall be 
authorised unless the relevant 
authority has satisfied itself 
that such authorisation is 
supported with adequate and 
sufficient evidence that the 
requirements of paragraph 1 of 
this Article are met as well as 
other legitimate factors and 
concerns as per the (amended) 
recital 32 and subsequent. 
 
An analogous amendment should be 
added to Art. 16 with regard to the 
GMO feed authorisations. 
 
The effect of this amendment also 
would be twofold. It changes the focus 
from the applicant, who is currently 
responsible for demonstrating safety, 
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to the public authorities – EFSA, the 
committees and the Commission in 
turn – who have to be convinced by 
that demonstration. In addition, the 
relevant authorities are reminded that 
they can move the authorisation 
forward only if they are satisfied with 
regard to the full range of legitimate 
factors. 
 
3)	Restoring	the	functionality	of	
the	committees	of	national	
experts	
 
Two alternative ways to overcome the 
persistent deadlock within the 
committee stage of the authorisation 
process can be considered.  
  
a) Simple majority in the Scientific 
Committee/Appeal Committee 
 
Art 35 (2) of the Food and Feed 
Regulation and Art 30 (2) of the 
Deliberate Release Directive could be 
amended in the sense that the 
committees (in this area) take decisions 
by simple majority of the Member 
States: 
 
Where reference is made to this 
paragraph, by way of exception 
from Regulation 182/2011, the 
Committee shall adopt its 
decision by a simple majority of 
its component members.  
 
While we recognise that voting by 
simple majority is rather exceptional in 
the Council or the committees of 
national representatives which 
normally mirror it (yet it is the rule 
under the Advisory procedure, Art. 4 
of Regulation 182/2011), in the view 
of the present author this is an 
adequate response to the persistent 
stalemate of committees over the past 
two decades. It should also be noted 
that the present system in effect 
requires a decision by qualified 
majority vote (QMV) for a GMO 
application to be rejected. This 
“reverse QMV” is even more 
exceptional and allows a minority of 
Member States in effect to force a new 
GMO upon the rest. On the other hand, 
this proposal is in line with the 
Commission’s own stated objective 
that “rules should be changed to ensure 
that the majority view of Member 
States is taken into account.” 
82 
b) Commission obliged to respect 
the predominant view of the 
Member States 
 
The following recital can be included 
in the Deliberative Release Directive 
and the Food and Feed Regulation: 
 
Without prejudice to the 
Commission being fully 
responsible for the adoption 
and content of any decision to 
authorise cultivation or 
marketing of a GMO, it shall 
take due account of the position 
of the Member States (and 
possibly the European 
Parliament) as expressed in the 
relevant committee. 
 
A stronger form of this would be: 
 
Without prejudice to its 
responsibility for the adoption 
and content of any decision to 
authorise cultivation or 
marketing of a GMO, the 
Commission should abstain 
from any authorisation 
whenever a majority of 
Member States remain 
unconvinced by the risk 
assessment and express their 
objection to the decision which 
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is proposed on the basis 
thereof. 
 
Both formulations are a weaker version 
of the previous proposal (a), as they 
preserve the present reverse QMV in 
the committees, yet they require the 
Commission to follow the predominant 
position of the states rather than the 
position of EFSA. The Commission is 
already required to take into account 
the predominant position of the appeal 
committee by recital 14 of Regulation 
182/2011. This text can be 
strengthened by adding an explicit 
statement to it that  
 
The failure of the committee to 
take a decision by qualified 
majority vote cannot be 
considered as indicating that 
no predominant position of the 
Member States is available.  
 
The words ‘as far as possible’ should 
be removed from recital 14. 
 
To confine this to the GMO area, this 
provision can be added to the 
Deliberative Release Directive and the 
Food and Feed Regulation instead of 
Regulation 182/2011 itself. 
 
4)		Involving	the	European	
Parliament	
 
Another way to restore the democratic 
control in the process is to involve the 
EP, the only legitimate representative 
of the citizens of the Union. Again, this 
is possible in two forms. The first is 
express involvement, as in the old 
regulatory procedure with scrutiny 
where, upon failure to reach any 
decision in the committees, the 
proposal laid before the EP is accepted 
unless voted down within four months. 
 
Art. 5a of Decision 1999/468 (now 
repealed) provides a workable model 
for this procedure. It can be introduced 
as a new Art 35a in the Food and Feed 
Regulation and Art 30a in the 
Deliberate Release Directive to apply 
respectively. 
 
A weaker alternative is for a recital to 
be added to the Food and Feed 
Regulation and the Deliberate Release 
Directive, committing the Commission 
to take into account any relevant 
resolutions of the EP as follows: 
 
Without prejudice to its 
responsibility for the adoption 
and content of any decision on 
cultivation or marketing of a 
GMO, the Commission should 
abstain from authorisations 
whenever the European 
Parliament remains 
unconvinced by the risk 
assessment and adopts a 
resolution objecting to the 
decision which is proposed on 
the basis thereof. 
 
This amendment is meant to oblige the 
Commission, whenever a resolution is 
passed (as in the case of Maize Pioneer 
1507), to decide against the 
authorisation.   
 
5)	Restoring	the	functionality	of	
the	precautionary	principle	in	
risk	analysis	
 
As discussed in the analysis of the 
current legislation, despite the clear 
commitment to the precautionary 
principle (Recital 8 of the Deliberate 
Release Directive), the current 
understanding of the Commission is 
that it applies only in the phase of risk 
management. As EFSA is not required 
to apply it at all, whenever its 
Regulating GMOs 
26 
assessments conclude, for lack of 
sufficient evidence to the contrary, that 
a GMO is ‘safe’ the risk manager is 
precluded from applying it. Thus, the 
principle is made redundant in all 
stages. In order to make it operative, it 
is essential to extend its application to 
risk assessment and emphasise that its 
aim is to empower, rather than 
constrain, the risk manager. 
 
Recital 8 of the Deliberative Release 
Directive, should be amended as 
follows: 
 
The precautionary principle 
has been taken into account in 
the drafting of this Directive 
and must be complied with 
when implementing it; it must 
be applied at all stages of risk 
analysis.  
 
Further, it should be 
recognised that lack of 
agreement on the risk 
assessment, and in particular, 
failure of the relevant 
committee to reach any 
decision, indicates that there is 
no certainty about the safety of 
the GMO being assessed. This, 
by itself, is sufficient to justify 
precautionary measures, if the 
risk managers – the 
Commission, and where 
applicable the committees (or 
the European Parliament) – 
choose to adopt such in 
response to citizens’ legitimate 
concerns. 
 
The second paragraph is not intended 
to introduce a requirement for “zero 
risk” but to assert that the stalemate 
itself may constitute a ground for 
precautionary action. 
 
6)		Strengthening	the	
independence	of	EFSA	and	
diversification	of	its	expertise		
 
The following recital should be added 
to the Food and Feed Regulation: 
 
It is incumbent upon EFSA to 
generate public confidence in 
its assessments; it is recognised 
that the failures of the relevant 
committees to adopt a decision 
either way is evidence that the 
completeness or the rigour of 
its assessment are contested, 
and the conclusion remains 
insufficiently convincing. 
 
This amendment would underline the 
responsibility of EFSA to persuade the 
public and gain trust in its assessments, 
and undermine the claims of the 
Commission that the job is done and 
the problem is one of “public 
misunderstanding of science”.  
 
The following recital should be added 
to the Deliberative Release Directive: 
 
The Commission and its 
advisory bodies shall conduct 
independent assessments 
wherever possible and in any 
event shall aim to reduce their 
reliance on information 
provided by the applicant.  
 
Further, Art. 4 (2) of the Directive 
should be supplemented as follows: 
 
The environmental risk 
assessment will be submitted to 
the European Environmental 
Agency for peer review.  
 
The purpose of the amendment is to 
increase the informational 
independence of EFSA. While it is 
unfeasible to require that all necessary 
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information is gathered by the Union 
agencies, they may be held to account 
politically and also judicially, to strive 
in that direction. 
 
The following text should be added to 
Art. 28(4) of the General Food Law: 
 
The scientific panel on GMO 
shall consist of members from 
various scientific disciplines, 
including from the social 
sciences, with a view to ensure 
balanced representation of all 
expertise which may be 
relevant for a comprehensive 
risk assessment. 
 
This amendment is necessary to enable 
EFSA to consider the safety of GMOs 
with regard to the relevant contextual 
factors as per the amendments 
suggested above. It is along the lines of 
the recent proposal by the European 
Ombudsman for the Commission’s 
expert groups in general.83 Currently 
an overwhelming number of the panel 
members are microbiologists and 
genetic engineers. Even if they were, 
as individuals, completely independent 
from the industry, their narrow 
specialisms assure that they share 
similar views. It is essential to ensure 
adequate representation of experts 
from other relevant fields such as 
ecologists and agronomists, and to 
allow adequate consideration of 
contextual factors including feedback 
from social scientists on the risk 
management measures. 
 
7)	Enhancing	public	
participation	
 
The following text should be added 
after paragraph 7 of Art. 6 of the Food 
and Feed Regulation: 
 
The Authority shall take due 
account of the opinions 
gathered. It shall prepare a 
summary of the concerns raised 
by the participants and take 
care to address them in its 
assessment. It shall forward 
them to the Commission, which 
may revise the terms of 
reference given to EFSA. The 
Commission shall take any 
such concerns into account in 
its own decisions with regard to 
the authorisation. 
 
Analogous text should be added after 
paragraph 1 of Art 9 of the Deliberate 
Release Directive: 
 
The opinions gathered shall be 
forwarded to the Commission, 
which shall take any such 
concerns into account in its 
own decisions with regard to 
the authorisation. Where 
appropriate, it may refer the 
issue to the relevant advisory 
bodies or revise the terms of 
reference given to any such 
body which has already been 
involved in the process. 
 
Current legislation provides an 
opportunity for public participation but 
fails to make even a token requirement 
that the opinions submitted via this 
channel will be taken into account in 
any way. The suggested amendment 
would make a commitment that the 
information gathered is fed into the 
assessment and used for identification 
of other factors which may be relevant. 
 
Art. 36 of the Food and Feed 
Regulation should be amended as 
follows: 
 
Any decision taken under, or 
failure to exercise, the powers 
vested in the Authority by this 
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regulation may be reviewed by 
the Commission on its own 
initiative or in response to a 
request from a Member State or 
from any person or non-
governmental organisation, 
provided that  
 
(a) it is an independent non-
profit-making legal person in 
accordance with a Member 
State's national law or 
practice; 
 
(b) it has the primary stated 
objective of promoting 
environmental protection in the 
context of environmental law; 
 
(c) it has existed for more than 
two years and is actively 
pursuing the objective referred 
to under (b); 
 
(d) the subject matter in respect 
of which the request for 
internal review is made is 
covered by its objective and 
activities. 
 
The purpose of this amendment is to 
extend the application of the Aarhus 
Convention to GMO authorisations. 
The conditions mirror those in 
Regulation 1367/2006 and would 
allow established environmental 
organisations which were ignored in 
the consultation pursuant to Art. 6 (7) 
to raise their concerns with the 
Commission. 
 
In summary, most of the suggested 
proposals are intended to make explicit 
the political nature of GMO 
authorisations and emphasise the 
discretion and the associated 
responsibility of the Commission. 
Notwithstanding this, the proposals do 
not call for a fundamental change, such 
as giving a central role to the Council 
or the European Parliament, or 
adopting the more radical approaches 
to risk and precaution suggested by 
Chapman and Taleb and colleagues. 
Rather, the proposals would change the 
existing system so that the 
Commission is no longer able to hide 
behind its advisors and can be held 
accountable through the existing 
political channels.
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IV.	The	Commission’s	
amendment	proposal	
 
The most important elements of the 
Commission’s own GM Review and 
GM Proposal have already been 
mentioned in the preceding parts. This 
part will only highlight how the 
Commission’s conclusions confirm the 
claims made in Part II. For reasons of 
space it will skip a number of fallacies 
in the Commission’s analysis of the 
existing legislation and case law, and 
will demonstrate that the proposal, if 
adopted, would set the Member States 
on a collision course with the 
provisions of the EU Treaties and 
possibly their WTO obligations.  
 
1)	Welcome	recognition	of	the	
flaws	of	the	GM	regime		
 
In its GM Review and Proposal the 
Commission officially admits that 
control over the authorisation process 
through committees of national experts 
is dysfunctional with the effect that the 
decision-making layer needed to 
confer legitimacy to the decisions is 
short-circuited. The second equally 
troubling admission is that it always 
defers to the opinions of EFSA. Its 
interpretation of the law, and 
especially of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the 
jurisprudence of the Union courts, is 
that it is obliged to do so. While this is 
arguable and not supported in the 
academic literature, the Commission 
itself strictly follows this 
interpretation; making this explicit is 
also welcome. In Part II it was 
demonstrated that this deference to the 
advisor taken together with the lack of 
functioning control amounts to 
unlawful delegation and renders the 
authorisation process illegal. Further to 
the purely legal argument, it is obvious 
that it is illegitimate for an obscure 
advisory body with no democratic 
underpinning to be in a position to 
decide sensitive questions on behalf of 
500 million citizens, disregarding the 
expressed position of their lawfully 
elected representatives. 
Notwithstanding this, the Commission 
does not even attempt to find a remedy 
but only offers an opportunity to the 
Member States to walk out. This is 
startling – if it was following the same 
logic in other areas, the internal market 
would have collapsed before it was 
established. Still, as a most 
extraordinary exception this opt-out 
policy could be a partial solution – of 
the illegitimacy if not of the illegality 
problem – if it were legally or 
materially possible. The third section 
of this part will return to the latter 
issues to show that it is not. 
 
The other welcome recognition in the 
GM Review is that ‘other legitimate 
factors’ are routinely not taken into 
account, despite the explicit 
requirements to the contrary of the 
Food and Feed Regulation and the 
Deliberative Release Directive. 
Essentially, the Commission identifies 
two problems which have led to the 
current controversy and impasse – the 
need for decisions to be reasoned and 
the need to consider all relevant 
factors. It correctly notes that Art. 41 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
requires that the administration gives 
reasons for its decisions, including 
those for authorisation of GMOs. 
However, nothing in the Charter, or 
elsewhere in the primary law, requires 
these reasons to be limited to those 
prompted by the EFSA opinion. On the 
contrary (as was shown in Part II, 
section 2), the secondary law explicitly 
calls upon the administration – and the 
Commission in particular – to take 
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other reasons into account. The 
obligations to justify its decisions and 
to take other factors into account are, 
in fact, complementary. If the 
Commission fails to respect both of 
them – as it recognises it does – it is 
necessary for the regime to be 
amended and the administration 
enabled to do so, rather than provide a 
margin of flexibility which we shall 
see that the Member States would have 
to struggle to make use of. If it is 
difficult for the Commission to justify 
a rejection of a GMO, how can the 
Member States be expected to do so 
when they will have the extra trouble 
of the apparent violation of Art. 34 
TFEU? 
To sum up, the present author agrees 
with the Commission that “it is 
important to maintain a single risk-
management system, based on 
independent risk assessment”. All that 
is needed is to make it really 
independent and adequate to the actual 
concerns that are being raised about 
GMOs.  
 
2)	Proposed	opt-outs	
 
The operative part of the GM Proposal 
consists of a single article which would 
allow the Member States to restrict or 
prohibit the use of authorised GMOs 
for food and feed on their territories. 
Pursuant to the first paragraph of the 
proposed Art. 34a, a Member State 
which chose to do so would be still 
bound by the centralised risk 
assessments it is unconvinced by, and 
which is the result of a process which 
is now admitted to be flawed.   
 
Before embarking on the analysis of 
the legal problems of that proposal it is 
worth being reminded that during the 
decade since the current regime was 
set in place, a number of Member 
States, hostile to GMOs, have 
introduced bans on cultivation but 
never a ban on their use. The obvious 
reason is that in an integrated market 
such bans cannot be enforced in 
practice, even if they were legal. Thus, 
the only remedy of the flawed regime 
that the Commission has proposed 
cannot be expected to work in practice. 
There is no need to list the obvious 
difficulties for a Member State if it 
were to restrict on its territory the use 
of a particular GMO variety that has 
been authorised in the single market, 
and especially the costs of enforcing 
such ban. The legality of the proposed 
ban has already been questioned in a 
number of academic publications84 so 
this report will briefly list only three 
problems which are related to the 
debate about the role of the ‘other 
factors’ in the risk analysis initiated 
above. The first one is the grounds on 
which such restrictive measures would 
be allowed by the amended Food and 
Feed Regulation. Secondly, even if a 
prohibition of the use of an authorised 
GMO is explicitly allowed by the 
secondary legislation, it would almost 
certainly run foul of the primary law of 
the EU. Finally, even if it can be made 
compatible with the free movement 
rules of the EU, it still runs the risk of 
violating the WTO rules. The 
following subsections will discuss 
these issues in turn. 
 
a) Vanishing grounds for restrictive 
measures 
 
In its current form, the GM Proposal 
makes it all but impossible to justify 
the restrictive measures that it seeks to 
allow. According to its Recital 7, they 
must be adopted on the basis of 
compelling grounds not related to 
human and animal health and the 
environment. According to Art. 34a 
(1)(a) and Recital 10, for all issues 
related to these areas, the Member 
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States would remain bound by the 
centralised risk assessment. Thus, the 
statements contained in EFSA’s 
opinions will pre-empt any conclusions 
of the national authorities to the 
contrary. This renders unacceptable as 
justification almost all of the concerns 
a Member State may have – indeed, 
few issues do not have implications for 
human or animal health or the 
environment in any way. For example, 
the anticipated adverse effects on 
consumption patterns or farming 
practices that a Member State may be 
worried about would not be valid 
grounds for restriction as they would 
be “related” to health and the 
environment accordingly. On the other 
hand, EFSA will continue to discount 
such factors as being outside of its 
remit. Thus, such concerns will 
remain unaccounted for at any level; 
instead of allowing the Member 
States to attend to such concerns, the 
GM proposal, if adopted, will 
officially entrench their exclusion. 
As argued throughout this report the 
factors relevant for the safety of a new 
technology are interrelated so if some 
of them are reserved for the Union 
administration to consider, and others 
are the domain of the states, neither 
will be able to carry out an adequate 
risk analysis.  Further to this, any 
national measure which survives the 
Scylla of justification will have to face 
the Charybdis of proportionality and 
non-discrimination review (Recital 8). 
 
b) Incompatibility with the primary 
EU law 
 
As the Commission itself notes, any 
measures adopted by the Member 
States pursuant to its GM Proposal will 
have to be reasoned, proportionate and 
indistinctly applicable. Even if the 
secondary legislation explicitly 
empowers the Member States to 
introduce them, they may be still found 
by the Union courts to constitute 
obstacles to trade, prohibited by Art. 
34 TFEU (free movement of goods). It 
should be noted that even though Art. 
36 allows a number of exceptions, and 
the Court has expanded the list of 
permissible grounds considerably, 
some of the legitimate concerns of the 
Member States, such as the protection 
of conventional or organic farming, are 
clearly not among the permissible 
exceptions. In the light of well-known 
cases of the Court of Justice,85 it is 
clear that the Court will subject any 
such measures – by definition 
antithetical to the single market – to 
very rigorous scrutiny. The need to 
adopt bans on a case-by-case basis 
compounds the difficulties further. As 
the Court is likely to review rigorously 
a broad spectrum of national policies 
to find inherently contradictory 
justifications86 it would be difficult for 
a Member State to convince it that the 
grounds invoked to prohibit the 
marketing of one GMO variety are 
genuine, if it has not already prohibited 
all other GMOs on the same grounds. 
On the other hand, it may have failed 
to prohibit the other GMOs simply 
because the government did not have 
the resources to defend a challenge of 
the prohibition. 
 
Anticipating such difficulties, Member 
States which have concerns about the 
GMO in question are likely to abstain 
from introducing restrictions and will 
continue to oppose the proposals for 
authorisation as intensely as they do 
now. Thus the opt-outs will fail to 
resolve the problems which the 
Commission identifies and will 
certainly fail to address the concerns of 
the Member States and of the citizens 
of Europe. In the view of the present 
author, the only palpable effect if such 
opt-outs are allowed would be to 
enable the Commission to exert 
Regulating GMOs 
32 
pressure on certain Member States to 
reduce their opposition to 
authorisations ex ante, with the vain 
promise that they will be able to limit 
the damage done thereafter. Thus, the 
proposed opt-out will at best be 
redundant and at worst will render the 
GM regime even more undemocratic. 
 
c) Incompatibility with the WTO 
rules 
 
Finally, the GM Proposal sets the 
Member States who wish to make use 
of the proposed opt-out on a collision 
course with their WTO obligations. As 
they are not allowed to use any health 
and environment related grounds 
anyway, the compliance with the 
Agreements on the Technical Barriers 
to Trade (TBT) and on the Application 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS) is unlikely to become 
an issue. However, it is quite likely 
that such measures will be found to be 
in violation of Art. III para 4 of the 
GATT Agreement, which stipulates 
“products … shall be accorded 
treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to like products of national 
origin in respect of all laws…” 
(emphasis added). Thus, the question 
arises whether the WTO dispute 
settlement panels will find, say, a 
GMO maize which is prohibited in 
compliance with the proposed Art. 34a 
of the Food and Feed Regulation, to be 
sufficiently like a non-GMO maize 
which is not prohibited. While most 
European citizens – even those who 
have no qualms about the technology – 
find GM varieties profoundly different 
from conventional crops, the WTO 
panels may think the opposite.  
As far as the law is concerned, for the 
time being the question of similarity 
has not been decided definitively. The 
GMO technology was an issue in EC-
Biotech87 but the Dispute Settlement 
Panel left open the matter of likeness 
of GMO and their conventional 
counterparts. However, in EC-
Asbestos,88 the Appellate Body 
identified the following criteria for 
likeness: (i) the properties, nature and 
quality of the products; (ii) the end-
uses of the products; (iii) consumers’ 
tastes and habits — more 
comprehensively termed consumers’ 
perceptions and behaviour — in 
respect of the products; and (iv) the 
tariff classification of the products. On 
this understanding, even if the 
widespread consumption of GMOs has 
demonstrably different effects along 
the whole food chain – on farming 
practices, pesticide use, bio-diversity 
and social structures – all of these will 
have to be discounted. All that would 
matter is whether the consumers 
perceive the end product to be just like 
the conventional one.89 In any event, 
Member States wishing to make use of 
the proposed opt-out will be forced 
into an uphill battle to prove the 
opposite. Their efforts will be further 
undermined by the fact of authorisation 
itself and also by EFSA, which opines, 
inter alia, on the similarity with 
conventional counterparts, essentially 
disregarding the factors which make 
them different. The fact that other 
Member States have not banned the 
same GMO will not help either, even if 
they have refrained from doing so only 
because they did not have the nerve to 
pursue such battles themselves. Thus, 
in all likelihood, the restrictive 
measures adopted in pursuance of the 
GM proposal will be found in violation 
of Art. III (4) GATT Agreement. 
 
To summarise: in its GM Review, the 
Commission admits that the risk 
management system is broken – as is, 
in our view, also the risk assessment – 
yet instead of proposing a way to fix 
the problem, it proposes to keep the 
system intact and only provides to 
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those who care a largely ineffective 
possibility of opting out of it. In the 
view of the present author, the GM 
Proposal, if ever adopted, would 
neither improve the existing 
centralised authorisation regime, nor 
provide an effective and legally sound 
way out of it. Instead of making the 
process more democratic and risk 
assessments more adequate to the real 
world, the Commission proposes an 
avenue of fragmentation of the single 
market without clear benefits to 
anyone.  All in all, it acknowledges 
that the current regime is flawed, but 
fails to notice most of the problems 
identified in Part II of this report; does 
not propose any measure to fix them as 
suggested in Part III; and proposes a 
route out of the single market which is 
not viable, as demonstrated in Part IV.  
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